Revolut is focused on its push into Israel by recruiting locally for roles that sit at the heart of a regulated bank, a signal that the British fintech is preparing for more than a light payments presence.
Job listings tied to its Israeli operations cover credit product management, banking operations, collections, compliance, risk, anti-money-laundering work, and related operational functions.
The mix suggests the company is building the control environment regulators expect, rather than staffing mainly for marketing or customer acquisition.
One compliance opening, for instance, calls for familiarity with the Bank of Israel’s Proper Conduct of Banking Business rules, together with Israeli consumer-protection and privacy requirements, and for prior experience inside risk and compliance frameworks.
That profile tracks with the licensing path Revolut has been pursuing.
In June 2025, Calcalist reported that the firm was in discussions with the Bank of Israel over a “lean bank” authorization.
Such a license would let it take deposits and compete more directly with established lenders, rather than remaining limited to payment-style services.
Local leadership is already in place.
Uri Nathan, previously chief executive of the digital bank Pepper, has been hired to run Revolut’s Israeli business.
The market he would enter is tightly held: five large banks dominate retail and commercial banking. Revolut would not arrive as a typical startup challenger.
The group says it serves more than 80 million customers and employs over 13,000 people worldwide. No public launch date for full Israeli operations has been set.
The expansion effort coincides with a difficult stretch for the company’s data-handling reputation.
In September 2026, Revolut confirmed that sensitive customer records had been disclosed to an unauthorized party after attackers used a compromised government email system—reported as an Italian interior-ministry channel—to pose as law enforcement.
Over a period of months, the firm responded to those requests and handed over material that, according to the attackers and subsequent reporting, included identity documents, contact details, verification images, account statements, and transaction histories for a limited set of customers, many of them described as holders of large crypto balances.
Revolut has characterized the episode as an external impersonation of official requests rather than a breach of its own systems, and has said customer funds were not touched.
Hackers later claimed roughly 680 accounts were involved and sought a multimillion-dollar ransom.
A separate exposure followed through DriveWealth, the US broker that previously supported Revolut’s US stock-trading service.
DriveWealth said an unauthorized party accessed its network on 4–5 September 2026 and exfiltrated personal data.
Affected historical records, dating from before Revolut changed how it shared customer details for stock trading in various markets, may include names, emails, phone numbers, postal addresses, employment information, citizenship, age, gender, and partial account numbers.
Revolut has said its own systems were not compromised in that incident, that passwords, card details, and identity documents held by Revolut were not part of the DriveWealth leak, and that funds and investments remained safe.
Customers in markets where personal details stopped being passed to DriveWealth after the model change were described as outside the scope of the newer records.
For Israeli supervisors weighing a lean bank license, the hiring spree shows operational intent. The recent incidents—both the response to compromised government accounts and the indirect exposure via DriveWealth—keep information-security and request verification practices in view as Revolut seeks a larger foothold.