The XRP Ledger Foundation has detailed a practical design that would allow account holders to adopt quantum-resistant signing keys and retire older ones, without raising the base transaction fee paid by users. The approach appears in the Foundation’s 2027 protocol roadmap (updated 4 November 2026) and forms part of a broader effort that aims for a full network transition by 2028.
Current accounts on the ledger rely on elliptic-curve schemes such as secp256k1 and Ed25519.
Each time an account authorizes a transaction, its public key is recorded on-chain.
A sufficiently powerful quantum computer could later use that publicly visible material to recover the corresponding private key—an attack often described as “harvest now, decrypt later.”
Every account that has ever sent a payment, including exchange and custodial wallets, has already exposed its public key in this way.
Under the Foundation’s design, an owner can register a new signing key based on ML-DSA-44 and then disable the original key.
Once the classical key is switched off, the previously exposed public key can no longer authorize transactions, closing the attack path. Account addresses and balances remain unchanged; no funds need to be moved to a new address.
The same mechanism is intended to cover validators and validator-list publishers, whose long-lived keys sign critical network messages.
ML-DSA-44 is a lattice-based digital-signature algorithm standardized by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2024 (FIPS 204) specifically to resist quantum attacks.
The trade-off is size.
A public key plus signature totals 3,732 bytes, compared with roughly 105 bytes for a conventional payment.
Including historical records and database overhead, the Foundation estimates storage at about 5,331 bytes per protected transaction versus a 1,704-byte baseline—roughly three times larger.
The proposal deliberately keeps the existing base fee unchanged.
On the XRP Ledger, transaction fees are destroyed rather than distributed to operators.
Consequently, the extra storage and bandwidth burden falls on the nodes that run the network rather than on ordinary users.
Developers are still resolving implementation details, including a discrepancy in which different code bases can derive inconsistent keys from the same seed, and further testing of network behavior when validators employ the larger signatures remains ahead.
The account-level design sits inside a multi-phase roadmap first outlined by Ripple in April 2026.
That plan includes contingency measures if classical cryptography is broken earlier than expected, experimental work with NIST algorithms in 2026, hybrid operation on development networks, and a formal amendment for native post-quantum signatures targeting completion no later than 2028.
The Foundation schedules a dedicated migration study for the first half of 2027, followed by development, review, and audit work into late 2027 or 2028.
Estimated costs for the quantum-related amendment itself fall in the range of a few hundred thousand dollars plus several hundred engineering hours, separate from the overall multi-million-dollar budget covering the full set of 2027 roadmap items.
No quantum-resistant account type is live on the main network today; the work remains a draft specification and research direction subject to community review, engineering refinement, and eventual validator consensus.
By enabling key rotation that preserves existing addresses while introducing a NIST-approved post-quantum scheme, the design aims to give holders a concrete path to greater security without imposing new per-transaction charges.
